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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether the religious identity of state legislators in India influences 
development outcomes, both for citizens of their religious group and for the population as a whole. 
Using an instrumental variables approach derived from a regression discontinuity, we find that 
increasing the political representation of Muslims improves health and education outcomes in the 
district from which the legislator is elected. We find no evidence of religious favoritism: Muslim 
children do not benefit more from Muslim political representation than children from other 
religious groups.  
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1.  Introduction 
In first past the post electoral systems where the “winner takes all”, minority social groups 
may be disadvantaged by the policy choices of democratically elected leaders. It is therefore 
pertinent to consider whether increasing the political representation of minority groups improves 
their outcomes. Theoretical models of democracy admit this possibility (Osborne and Slivinski 1996, 
Besley and Coate 1997) and quotas for minority groups are motivated by the assumption that it does 
but, as we discuss below, the evidence is still scarce.
1 We examine this question by looking at the 
impact of Muslim representation in India’s state legislatures on development outcomes for Muslims 
relative to others. This study is of topical relevance given the increasing politicization of religion in 
India and the frequency of Hindu-Muslim violence.  
Muslims are, on many fronts, as disadvantaged a minority group in India as the lower caste 
population. Yet while political quotas for the lower castes have been in place since the writing of the 
Indian constitution in 1950, there are no quotas for Muslims and no systematic data on their political 
representation. We create representative nationwide data on Muslim political participation, inferring 
religion from name. These data show that Muslims are under-represented in state government 
relative to their population share. To identify causal impacts of politician identity when electoral 
outcomes may in general be correlated with constituency level voter preferences or characteristics 
that make religion salient, we exploit close elections between Muslim and non-Muslim (primarily 
Hindu) politicians. This allows us to examine the effects of politician identity while holding voter 
identity constant. We isolate the policy consequences of the personal religious identity of legislators 
from their political party affiliation by controlling for party affiliation. 
We find that raising the share of Muslims elected from a district to the state legislature leads 
to improved health and education outcomes in the district. An increase in Muslim representation by 
1 percentage point results in a statistically significant decline in infant mortality of 0.148 percentage 
points on average, which is 1.8% of the sample mean, and a more imprecisely determined increase 
of 0.09 years of primary schooling, which is approximately 2.5% of the sample mean. So as to put a 
1 percentage point change in perspective, note that the mean of Muslim legislator share at the 
district level is 6.4% and the mean of Muslim population share is 12.9%.
2 Our estimates therefore 
                                                 
1 Quotas introduce distortions, for instance by lowering candidate quality, so the impact of quotas will in general not be 
the same as the impact of competitively determined representation. However, evidence of the impact of minority groups 
in government in the absence of quotas is relevant to motivating quotas. 
2 The median district in the sample has nine seats so, on average, less than one in nine seats is held by a Muslim. The 
figures presented here are for the estimation sample and exclude the only Muslim-majority state, Jammu and Kashmir.  3 
 
imply that Muslim representation proportional to population share will have large beneficial impacts 
on child development outcomes.  
Importantly, we find no significant difference in the impact of Muslim political 
representation on Muslim compared with non-Muslim households. Indeed, the estimated 
coefficients indicate smaller beneficial impacts for Muslim children. There is thus no evidence of 
religious favoritism. The fact that our estimates for health and education use different data sources 
and a different set of cohorts but line up on both results adds credence to the findings. 
Our findings contribute to a recent literature on the relationship between religion and 
development. While cross-country comparisons indicate that religious beliefs are a significant 
determinant of economic growth, and that Muslim countries have lower growth rates controlling for 
their religiosity (Barro and McCleary 2006), two recent studies show that Islamist parties perform 
better than non-Islamist parties. Meyersson (2013) shows that women’s education improves in 
municipalities led by Islamist as opposed to secular parties in Turkey, and Henderson and Kuncoro 
(2011) find that Islamist parties commit less corruption in Indonesia than other parties. An 
important difference between our approach and that of prior studies is that we focus on the 
personal religious identity of legislators and control for the religious composition of the population 
and the party affiliation of legislators.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on politician identity. If parties or voters could 
fully control the behavior of elected candidates, politician identity would be irrelevant to the policy 
process but the evidence tends to reject this tenet. The evidence so far pertains to the relevance of 
the ethnicity and gender of politicians, and we provide the first evidence for religion. A number of 
studies show that raising the share of women in government influences policy choices, with a 
tendency for policy choices to more closely reflect the interests of women (Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo 2004, Washington 2008, Clots-Figueras 2011, Clots-Figueras 2012, Bhalotra and Clots-
Figueras 2013, Brollo and Troiano 2012, Iyer et. al. 2012). However women are not a numerical 
minority. This makes it easier to associate the impact of politician gender with politician preferences 
only, while the behavior of politicians from minority groups may in addition reflect strategic 
electoral considerations. The results on ethnic identity of politicians are more ambiguous. Using data 
from Kenya, Burgess et al. (2011) find that politicians (cabinet members) allocate road building 
efforts in favour of their own ethnic group but this ethnic favoritism dissipates upon the transition 
to democracy. In this sense, their results are consistent with our findings from (democratic) India. 
Pande (2003) finds that political quotas for low caste populations in India’s state assemblies are 4 
 
associated with increased transfers to their group alongside reduced overall spending and reduced 
spending on education.
3 These results contrast with ours, possibly because quotas depress any 
incentive for the low caste (Hindu) population to serve the interests of other social groups. Kramon 
and Posner (2012) find that co-ethnics of the President and the Minister of Education in Kenya see 
an increase in education but not in health, while Kudamatsu (2009) is unable to identify any impact 
of the ethnic identity of the President of Guinea on ethnic differences in infant mortality. Our 
results contrast with these studies insofar as we find effects on both health and education outcomes.  
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the political setting in India, 
the political status of Muslims and their relative status on human development indicators. Sections 3 
and 4 describe the data and the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses the results and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Religion, Politics and Development in India 
India is a country of considerable religious diversity and the constitution enshrines 
secularism. Muslims, constituting 13.4% of the population in the 2001 census, form the single largest 
religious minority in India. With 138 million Muslims in 2001, India had the third largest Muslim 
population in the world. Muslims in India are more likely to live in urban areas (36% compared to 
28%), and their population share varies substantially across the states and within states across 
districts. They are, on average, poorer than Hindus: 31% of Muslims were below the poverty line in 
2004-05, much higher than the figure of 21% for upper-caste Hindus and comparable to the figure 
of 35% for lower castes (Government of India 2006). Yet, while India has political quotas for low 
caste representation in state assemblies and local governments, there are no quotas for Muslims.
4 
Using newly coded data, described below, we find that Muslims comprised only 9% of the members 
of state assemblies over the period 1977-1998, substantially lower than their population share.  
India is a federal country in which the constitution grants substantial policy autonomy to the 28 
states. Elections to state legislatures are held every five years on a first-past-the-post basis in single-
member constituencies. There are very few “Muslim-only” parties, but some parties appeal more to 
Muslims than others. Indian states largely determine their own health and education budgets, 
although they receive supplementary funds from federal programs.  
                                                 
3 Similarly, Besley, Pande and Rao (2012) find evidence from Indian villages that sharing the village head’s group identity 
is beneficial for access to public goods but only for low spillover public goods. 
4 See Jensenius (2013) for a discussion of the historical reasons underlying the absence of electoral quotas for Muslims. 5 
 
Overall health and education outcomes are poor in India, largely a function of weak provision of 
public services in these sectors. In our household survey data from 1977-1998, 22% of respondents 
were illiterate and 8.2% of children did not survive beyond the first year of life (Table 1). Consistent 
with their greater poverty rates, Muslims lagged behind on education outcomes, with 27% of 
Muslims being recorded as illiterate compared to 21% of non-Muslims. Yet, Muslim children exhibit 
a substantial survival advantage (infant mortality rates of 6.86% compared to 8.42% for non-
Muslims), a bit of a puzzle given that Muslims are, on average, less educated, poorer and have larger 
families (Bhalotra, Valente and van Soest 2010). Muslim households also faced discrimination in 
obtaining government loans and pensions (Government of India 2006), and in access to 
infrastructure, health and transport facilities (Das, Kar and Kayal 2011). Violence between Hindus 
and Muslims occurs frequently and there is some evidence that an increase in Muslim incomes 
relative to Hindu incomes often triggers such violence (Mitra and Ray 2013). 
 
3.  Data on Politician Religious Identity and Child Development Outcomes 
3.1  The Religious Identity of Candidates for State Legislative Assemblies 
We construct a unique data base on the religious identity of candidates for state legislators. 
We obtained data on state legislative elections from the Election Commission of India that contain 
information on the name, party affiliation and votes obtained by every candidate in every state 
election held in India since Independence. We infer religious identity from candidate names. To 
minimize measurement error, we had two independent teams conduct the classification of legislator 
names. The first used software called Nam Pehchan (which translates as Name Recognition) which was 
able to classify about 72% of the names, and manually classified the rest. The second (India-based) 
team performed the entire classification manually using their judgment gained from prior work with 
Election Commission files. The two teams agreed on more than 95% of the names, and 
disagreements between the two teams’ classification were resolved by the authors on a case-by-case 
basis. In the final dataset, we remained doubtful of the religious identity of less than 0.5% of names 
and these were assigned a “non-Muslim” classification. 
The political data are available at the candidate and constituency level, but in the surveys that 
record individual level health and educational outcomes we can only identify the district, not the 
constituency, in which they live. We therefore aggregate the political data to the district level using 
administrative district boundaries as of 1991. The number of electoral constituencies per 
administrative district varies, but the median district has 9 constituencies and 95% of districts have 6 
 
17 or fewer constituencies. We use data from the 16 largest states in India (excluding Jammu and 
Kashmir), during the period 1977-1998. The rationale for starting the analysis in 1977 and not earlier 
is twofold. First, during this period, state constituency boundaries remained fixed while before 1977 
the number of constituencies increased over time due to periodic redistricting. This could affect our 
identification strategy because the fraction of Muslim legislators in a district could depend on factors 
other than whether they won elections, such as population changes or religion-biased redistricting. 
Second, the set of political parties was very different in the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, the Hindu 
nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), did not exist before 1980. In any case, we show 
that our results are robust to extending the data back in time to include cohorts from 1961 onwards. 
The availability of health and educational data with clear district identifiers limits us from extending 
the analysis beyond 1998. The only Muslim-majority state of Jammu & Kashmir is excluded from 
our main regression specification, but we show that our results are robust to its inclusion. District 
means of the electoral variables are in Table 1, Panel C. In the estimation sample excluding Jammu 
and Kashmir, 6.4% of legislators were coded as Muslim, and 64% of district-year observations had 
no Muslim legislators.  
 
3.2  Health Indicators 
Health indicators at the mother and child level are drawn from the National Family Health 
Survey of India (NFHS), a nationally representative survey conducted in 1998-1999. Mothers aged 
15-49 years at the time of the survey are asked to record their birth histories and any child deaths. 
This allows us to construct individual level childhood mortality risk indicators that vary over time 
and can be matched to changes in Muslim representation over time. We focus on neonatal and 
infant mortality, defined as dummies for whether the child died in the first month and the first year 
of life respectively. Infant mortality is widely used as an indicator of population health. Since infant 
and neonatal mortality respond primarily to policies effective in the year before birth, we match 
these individual outcomes to the share of Muslim politicians in the year before birth in the district of 
birth. Since the data record district of residence rather than district of birth, we restrict the sample to 
children who were conceived in their current location.
5 The neonatal mortality in the sample is 5.3%, 
the infant mortality rate is 8.2% and 14% of births in the sample take place in a Muslim household 
(Table 1, Panel A).  
                                                 
5 Approximately 16% of the survey respondents moved to their current area of residence after the child was 
conceived. 7 
 
 
3.3  Education Indicators 
These data are drawn from the 55
th round of the nationally representative National Sample 
Survey (NSS), collected during 1999-2000. We restrict attention to individuals aged 14 and older, to 
be sure that they are old enough to have completed primary education, and the oldest individual in 
the education sample is 26. We create two dependent variables to indicate whether the individual is 
illiterate and the number of years of primary education completed. The data contain information on 
whether the individual has completed primary or has dropped out before finishing primary 
education. As in Hnatkovska et al (2012), we create the “years of primary education” variable by 
assigning the value 0 to illiterate individuals, 2 to those who started but did not complete primary 
education, and 5 to those who completed primary.
6 As many as 22% of individuals in the sample are 
illiterate and average years of primary education are 3.67. 
Only politicians in power before the child completed primary education can affect the 
likelihood of completing it. Since individuals vary in the age at which they start school, we matched 
individuals to legislator identity in the three years leading up to their primary school participation. 
We drop from the sample individuals who migrated from another district after they were six years 
old as they will have studied in districts in which other politicians were in power.  
 
4.  Empirical Strategy 
To investigate the effect of the religious identity of politicians on health and educational outcomes, 
we would like to estimate the parameters of the relationship:  
 
Yidst= a +b Mdst +eidst 
 
where Yidst  is the health or education outcome for individual i  born in district d in state s in year t, 
and Mdst is the fraction of constituencies in the district held by Muslim politicians in the year before 
birth for survival outcomes and in the three years before the individual turned six for the education 
outcomes. The identification challenge is to estimate a causal relationship by separating this from 
                                                 
6 Given the timing of elections (post-1980) and the duration of secondary education, we do not have enough 
cohorts in the 1999 survey to examine secondary education. We focus therefore upon primary education 
which, for the cohorts in the sample, is far from universal (see Table 1). 
 8 
 
any effects of omitted variables that may drive health/education and religious political 
representation.  
We address this challenge by using close elections between non-Muslim and Muslim 
candidates, that is, elections in which the difference in votes between the winner and the runner-up 
(the vote margin) is small. In a regression discontinuity approach, all variables correlated with the 
election of a Muslim versus a non-Muslim are controlled for as long as they vary smoothly at the 
threshold of a zero vote margin, and as long as there is no manipulation of the running variable (the 
vote margin) i.e. that both candidates have a comparable chance of winning a close election. This 
ensures that around the discontinuity, the constituencies that elect a Muslim versus a non Muslim 
are very similar along all dimensions other than from the religious identity of their candidate. In 
particular, they are similar in voter preferences. On this basis we instrument the fraction of all seats 
in a district won by Muslim politicians with the fraction of seats in the district won by Muslim 
politicians in a close election against a non-Muslim politician. We define close elections as elections 
in which the winner won by a margin of less than 2% of votes, and we investigate robustness of the 
results to using a 3% margin instead. 
However, even if close elections ensure the intern validity of our estimates, the existence of 
close elections between Muslims and non-Muslims in a given district and year is unlikely to be 
exogenous, and is likely to depend upon factors such as the share of Muslims in the population, their 
relative status and the extent to which religion is politicized in the region. We therefore control for 
the fraction of seats in the district that were contested in close elections between Muslim and non-
Muslim candidates. This also controls for any direct effects of having close elections, such as greater 
political mobilization by parties or greater salience generated by the “excitement” of a close contest. 
At the constituency level, close elections can be exploited to implement a regression 
discontinuity design. Since the share of Muslim legislators is defined at the district level (in order to 
match the electoral data to health and education outcomes), we effectively aggregate over the 
constituency-specific discontinuities in treatment assignment within district, in the spirit of a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity. The estimated equations control for a polynomial in the victory margin 
(positive or negative) in every election between a Muslim and a non-Muslim candidate in the district. 
The model is estimated using two-stage least squares. Here, equation (1) is the second stage and 
equation (2) is the first stage: 
 
(1)        Yidst=  θds+ ψt+ πst +β Mdst+λTCdst+Σ
N
j=1 α1j Ijdst*G(mjdst)+ Σ
N
j=1 α2j Ijdst +Xidst η + εidst 9 
 
 
(2)     Mdst =  θds+ ψt+ πst +κ MCdst+μTCdst+ Σ
N
j=1ϑ1j Ijdst*G(mjdst)+ Σ
N
j=1 ϑ2j Ijdst +Xidst σ + uidt  
 
The fraction of constituencies in the district that were won by Muslim politicians in a given 
election year, Mdst, is instrumented with the fraction of constituencies in the district won by Muslims 
in close elections against non-Muslim in the same year, MCdst. The fraction of constituencies in the 
district in which there were close elections between Muslims and non-Muslims, TCdst, is controlled 
for in the second stage (equation 1) and partialled out of the instrument in the first stage (equation 
2). The margin of victory or defeat of every Muslim candidate who contested against a non-Muslim 
in election j in the district is denoted mjdst. We use third order polynomials in these margins, denoted 
G(mjdst). The polynomials are interacted with Ijdst, which is an indicator for whether there was an inter-
religious election in the district. To allow observations in a district to be correlated across families in 
the district and across time, the standard errors are clustered at the district level.  
Our baseline specification uses district fixed effects θds which account for sluggish 
demographic characteristics (including the share of the district population that is Muslim), the slowly 
moving component of the public goods infrastructure and time-invariant voter preferences. Cohort 
fixed effects ψt afford a flexible representation of aggregate shocks or nationwide policies that may 
have influenced both public services and the religion mix of politicians. We also include state*cohort 
dummies, πst, which account for relevant state-level and election-specific shocks or policies. Xidst is a 
vector of individual-level control variables including dummies for individual religion, gender, rural vs 
urban residence and whether the individual belongs to a scheduled caste or tribe (which we loosely 
refer to as “low caste”) or to the “Other Backward Castes”.
7 Given that Muslim winners in close 
elections are more likely to belong to the Indian National Congress (INC) party than non-Muslim 
winners and less likely to belong to the BJP party (Table A4), we control for the fraction of seats in 
the district won by INC and the BJP. 
Regression discontinuity has been previously used in the context of elections by Lee (2002) 
who studies incumbency advantage, by Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) who looks at the effect of party 
control on fiscal policies and by Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004) who estimate the effect of the degree 
of electoral strength on legislators' voting behavior. Our approach of using an IV strategy 
approximating a fuzzy regression discontinuity has antecedents in the work of Angrist and Lavy 
                                                 
7 The Scheduled Castes are communities that have historically been at the bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy. 
Scheduled Tribes include communities traditionally outside the Hindu caste system. 10 
 
(1999) who estimated the effect of class size on educational achievements and the work of Rehavi 
(2007), Clots-Figueras (2011 and 2012) and Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2013), who estimate related 
specifications to investigate the policy impact of the gender of elected politicians. 
To investigate whether Muslims in particular gain from a rise in the share of Muslim 
politicians, we interact Mdst (Muslim legislator share) with an indicator for whether the individual 
child is Muslim (muslimidst). To implement the IV procedure, we also interact the instrument with the 
Muslim dummy. The second stage regression is then: 
     
(3)  Yidst=  θds+ ψt+ πst +β Mdst+γ Mdst*muslimidst +ξ muslimidst +λTCdst+Σ
N
j=1 α1j Ijdst*G(mjdst)+ Σ
N
j=1 α2j Ijdst 
+Xidst η + εidst 
 
The coefficient β captures the impact of Muslim legislators on non-Muslims, while the coefficient γ 
indicates the additional impact on Muslim children.  
 
5.  Muslim Political Representation and Development Outcomes 
5.1 Validity of the Instrumental Variable Strategy 
The share of Muslims winning close elections against non-Muslims is a strong and significant 
predictor of the overall fraction of Muslim legislators in a district (Table A1). The F-statistics from 
the first stage regressions shown in Table A1 are large for regressions run at the individual and 
district levels, so we can rule out a weak instruments problem.
8  Figure 1 provides a graphical 
illustration of the first stage. It plots the overall fraction of Muslim legislators against the average 
vote margin across districts. The victory margin is defined as the difference in vote share between 
Muslim and non-Muslim candidates, so that margin>0 denotes a Muslim electoral victory and 
margin<0 denotes a non-Muslim victory. We show that, at the zero margin, there is a dramatic jump 
in the district share of Muslim legislators. In other words, if a Muslim wins a close election, the 
overall fraction of Muslim legislators rises significantly. 
As discussed earlier, our instrumental variables strategy requires the probability of winning a 
close election to be the same for the two types of candidates. un. A potential violation of this 
assumption would arise if there were vote manipulation that biased the outcome of a close election. 
To check against this possibility, we verify that the distribution of the vote margin is continuous 
around the neighbourhood of zero, the threshold which separates Muslim victory from non-Muslim 
                                                 
8 The districts results are available upon request 11 
 
victory (Figure 2a). We tested this formally by estimating the difference in the densities on either 
side of the zero point (McCrary 2008). The estimated difference is -0.065, which is statistically 
insignificant (Figure 2b). We further verify that household characteristics are not different across 
places where Muslims won or lost in close elections by regressing these characteristics on the share 
of Muslim legislators, instrumented by the share of Muslims winning in close elections (Table A2). 
This makes us confident that our IV strategy is comparing places with similar underlying 
characteristics. 
Another possible threat to our identification strategy arises if Muslim legislators who win in 
close elections against non-Muslims are significantly different from non-Muslims along dimensions 
other than religion because we might then mistakenly attribute the effects of other characteristics to 
religious identity. We therefore examine available characteristics of Muslim and non-Muslim winners 
in close elections (Table A3). Muslim winners are significantly less likely to belong to the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), the party espousing a pro-Hindu ideology, and more likely to belong to the 
Indian National Congress (INC). Since we want to capture the effects of religious identity rather 
than party ideology, we control for the overall fraction of BJP and INC legislators in the district. 
Membership of other parties (Left parties, other regional parties, independents) is not significantly 
different by candidate religion. Muslim legislators are less likely to be female than non-Muslim 
legislators (2% compared to 5.4%), but the difference is not statistically significant. We also verify 
that election characteristics, such as the total number of candidates and the total number of voters, 
do not differ significantly across places where Muslims win vs lose close elections against non-
Muslims. 
 
5.2 Estimating the Impact of Muslim Legislators on Development Outcomes 
OLS estimates suggest a very small and insignificant effect of  Muslim legislator share on health 
and education outcomes (Tables 2 and 3, columns 1 and 5). However, OLS regressions are likely to 
be biased due to omitted variables bias and potential reverse causality. The share of Muslim 
legislators is likely to be correlated with underlying voter preferences and other area characteristics. 
In particular, Muslim politicians are more likely to be elected in areas with larger Muslim 
populations, which may also have a   lower level of public goods provision (Das, Kar and Kayal 
2011There could also be reverse causality in the sense that if Muslim politicians are more likely to 
provide better health services, then they are more likely to win in places where public service 
provision is particularly poor and hence there is a greater underlying demand for such services. In 12 
 
contrast, the 2SLS results take advantage of the fact that in some areas Muslims won by very few 
votes against a non-Muslim candidate and in other areas Muslims lost by very few votes against a 
non-Muslim candidate. Such areas are likely to have similar Muslim population shares, similar 
candidate ability and similar access to public goods ex-ante. We find that raising the share of Muslim 
legislators in the district leads to a large and statistically significant decline in infant and neonatal 
mortality rates. Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (1), with increasing number of 
controls (columns 2-3, 6-7). In the preferred specification (column 3), which includes third degree 
polynomials in constituency vote margins and controls for party composition, we estimate that 
increasing the share of Muslim legislators by 1 percentage point results in a decline in infant 
mortality of 0.148 percentage points, which is roughly 1.8% of the mean rate.
9 The corresponding 
decline in the neo-natal mortality rate is 0.11 percentage points, nearly 2.1% of the mean. These 
estimates suggest substantial developmental benefits to improving the political representation of 
minority religious groups. 
Our second major finding is that these gains in child mortality are not limited to Muslim 
families. If anything, we find the opposite: the reduction in infant mortality associated with a 1% 
point increase in Muslim representation is 1.16 percentage points among Muslim families compared 
to 1.58 percentage points among non-Muslims (column 4), though the difference between the two 
groups is statistically insignificant. The corresponding values for neo-natal mortality are 0.55% for 
Muslims and 1.27% for non-Muslims (column 8). There is thus no evidence that Muslim legislators 
are targeting public services towards Muslim families. 
A potential explanation of this result is that Muslims have stronger preferences over child health 
(see Bhalotra, Valente and Van Soest 2010) so they prioritize it and the apparently large benefits 
accruing to non-Muslims represent a process of convergence, since the baseline child survival rates 
of Muslims are higher. However, we find a similar pattern of results when we examine education 
outcomes, in which Muslims lag behind non-Muslims (Table 1). Muslim political representation 
results in a decline in the share of the population which is illiterate and an increase in years of 
primary school education (Table 3). While the average coefficients are imprecisely estimated, we find 
significant effects once we allow heterogeneity by religion. Among non-Muslims, the illiteracy rate 
declines by 0.25 percentage points for a 1 percentage point increase in Muslim political 
                                                 
9 There are 9 legislators in the median district and the mean share of Muslim legislators in the sample is 6.4% (s.d. 13%). 
To put the 1% point changes in perspective note that increasing the share of Muslim legislators by 10% points is roughly 
equivalent to adding one Muslim legislator to the median district, and not dissimilar to an increase of one standard 
deviation. 13 
 
representation (column 4) and years of primary education increase by 0.01 years (column 8). The 
corresponding effects of Muslim political representation on the educational attainment of Muslims 
are smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
Taken together, the health and education results show a consistent pattern whereby raising the 
share of Muslims in India’s state assemblies improves developmental outcomes for children, with no 
evidence of differential benefits flowing to Muslim children. 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks  
The results reported above stand up to a number of specification checks, presented in Tables 4 
(health) and 5 (education). The estimates are robust to expanding the definition of close elections to 
include elections with a vote margin of up to 3% (column 1). Narrowing to a vote margin of 1% or 
less results in similar sized coefficients but we lose precision and the estimates are no longer 
statistically significant (column 2). The estimates are similar if we control for state-specific trends 
instead of state*year fixed effects (column 3). The coefficients are also stable in a specification that 
controls for district-specific trends. The relevant variation is at the district level, but this is a much 
more demanding specification and the standard errors increase, making the overall coefficient 
statistically insignificant (column 4). Including the Muslim-majority state of Jammu & Kashmir raises 
the estimated main effect (column 5). This limits the weight of mechanisms that rest upon Muslims 
being a minority population group. Extending the sample back to include cohorts from 1961 
onwards (column 6) also increases the estimated positive impact of Muslim legislators which is 
interesting since the politicization of religion was greater in the 1980s and the 1990s. To allow for 
the possibility that one year may be too soon for a legislator to be effective in changing health 
outcomes, we replace the presence of a Muslim legislator in the year prior to birth with a variable 
measuring the average share of Muslim legislators in the three years prior to the birth of the 
individual child. The coefficient is similar to that in the baseline specification (column 7). In all of 
these specifications, there continues to be no evidence that Muslim households benefit 
disproportionately from the presence of a Muslim legislator. 
We conducted a “placebo” exercise to verify that it is indeed the presence of Muslim legislators 
prior to birth which matters for child health outcomes, rather than unobserved area or household 
characteristics which might be correlated with both child health outcomes and the share of Muslim 
legislators. We examine whether exposure to Muslim legislators after the first year of life is correlated 
with child health outcomes. As there is no plausible mechanism to support such a correlation, 14 
 
evidence of it would signal mis-specification. Since legislators typically have a five year term, Muslim 
representation in the year after birth is likely to be correlated with Muslim representation in the year 
before birth. We therefore look at Muslim representation five years after birth, during which at least 
one election would have occurred. The coefficient on Muslim legislator share is much smaller in 
magnitude and the interaction coefficient are both statistically insignificant. The placebo results 
satisfy us that omitted variables are not driving the main findings (column 8). 
The same battery of robustness checks was conducted for the education outcomes and the 
results are robust to the range of checks (Table 5). The one exception is a reduction in coefficient 
size when we replace the share of Muslim legislators in the 3 years prior to primary school age with 
the share of Muslim legislators in the one year prior to joining school (column 7), consistent with 
legislators needing to be in power longer in order to affect educational outcomes. The “placebo” for 
education is specified to examine whether the presence of Muslim legislators matters for children 
who are exposed after the age of completion of primary schooling (Table 5, column 8). As for the 
health outcomes, the estimated coefficient is much smaller and statistically insignificant. 
We conducted a further set of robustness checks to verify that the results are not dependent on 
the specific functional form used to control for the presence of close inter-religious elections in the 
district. Replacing the fraction of close elections in the district (TCdst) with the number of close 
elections or dummies for zero, one or two close elections, yields very similar coefficients to our 
preferred specification. Restricting the sample to only district-years with at least one inter-religious 
election does not affect our results. Further restricting the sample to at least one inter-religious close 
election  increases the magnitude of the coefficients for health outcomes, while reducing it for 
education outcomes (all these results are available upon request). 
 
6.  Conclusions 
We use unique data on the religious identity of politicians, and an instrumental variables strategy 
based on the discontinuity in treatment assignment in close elections to estimate the causal effect of 
electing Muslims to state legislatures. We find that raising Muslim representation in India’s state 
legislatures leads to large and significant improvements in child survival rates and improvements in 
educational attainment. We find no evidence of religious favouritism, if at all, Muslim households 
benefit less from Muslim politicians than non-Muslim households. The estimates are robust to a 
number of specification checks, including different sample windows and different margins for 15 
 
defining close elections, and do not appear to be driven by omitted district and time varying 
unobservables. 
Why might Muslim leaders have greater incentives than other (primarily Hindu) leaders to 
deliver improvements in child health and education? We should note that our empirical strategy 
controls for explanations based on political competition or party ideology, since we are comparing 
places with high levels of political competition (close elections) where only the religion of the winner 
is different.
10 We can also rule out that the results are due to Muslim politicians’ alignment with the 
ruling coalition in the state, a factor which has been shown to be important for other outcomes 
(Asher and Novosad, 2013). In fact, 37% of Muslim winners of close elections are aligned with the 
ruling coalition in the state, while the corresponding number for non-Muslims is 45% (Table A3), 
and this difference is not statistically significant.  
The most likely explanation is that Muslim politicians have stronger preferences for publicly 
provided services essentially because Muslim voters are, on average, poorer and so more reliant 
upon them. However, this alone would predict larger gains to Muslim households from Muslims in 
government. So, in order to explain our findings, this preference hypothesis needs to be combined 
with barriers to targeting benefits to Muslim households. Perhaps Muslims are not sufficiently 
residentially segregated for targeting to be feasible, or perhaps there are political incentives for 
Muslim politicians to avoid showing favor for members of their own group. Muslim leaders may act 
strategically to attract votes from the non-Muslim community, who constitute the numerical 
majority in most constituencies. A different possibility, consistent with Muslim leaders representing 
the interests of Muslim citizens, is that they prioritize reducing Hindu-Muslim conflict, and equal 
provision of public goods is a means to this end.
11  
   
                                                 
10 See Blakeslee (2013), Jha (2012) and Wilkinson (2004) on how political or economic competition changes the 
incentives of political parties and the incidence of religious violence. 
11 In work in progress we investigate the impact of Muslim legislators on religious conflict (Bhalotra, Clots-
Figueras and Iyer 2013). 16 
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Between 
district
Within 
district
Non-Muslim 
households
Muslim 
households
Infant mortality (scaled 0-100) 128100 8.21 27.45 3.65 27.23 8.42 6.86
Neonatal mortality (scaled 0-100) 128100 5.29 22.38 2.56 22.25 5.41 4.49
Rural resident 128100 0.77 0.42 0.23 0.35 0.79 0.65
Muslim 128100 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.30 0.00 1.00
Scheduled caste 128100 0.20 0.40 0.12 0.39 0.23 0.03
Scheduled tribe 128100 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.12 0.01
Male child 128100 0.52 0.50 0.04 0.50 0.52 0.51
Age of mother at birth of child 128100 23.64 5.22 1.22 5.10 23.56 24.17
Years of education of mother 128094 2.48 3.93 1.88 3.52 2.55 2.06
Years of education of father 128100 5.29 4.82 1.77 4.55 5.46 4.19
Panel B: Education and Demographics, Individual data, NSS 1999-2000, individuals aged 14 or more at survey date
Illiterate 109448 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.39 0.21 0.27
Years of education up to primary 109448 3.67 2.11 0.76 1.98 3.72 3.37
Muslim 109448 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.32 0.00 1.00
Male child 109448 0.54 0.50 0.05 0.50 0.54 0.53
Scheduled caste 109448 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.23 0.09 0.01
Scheduled tribe 109448 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.37 0.20 0.01
Other backward caste (OBC) 109448 0.36 0.48 0.20 0.43 0.36 0.33
Rural resident 109448 0.63 0.48 0.21 0.43 0.66 0.49
Panel C: Electoral Variables. District-year data, Election Commission of India, 1977-1998.
Proportion of seats in the district won by a Muslim politician 8549 0.064 0.130
Proportion seats in the dist won by Muslim in close election against non-Muslim 2% 8549 0.005 0.027
Proportion seats that had close elections Muslim vs non-Muslim 2% 8549 0.011 0.040
Proportion seats in the dist won by Muslim in close election against non-Muslim 1% 8549 0.003 0.022
Proportion seats that had close elections Muslim vs non-Muslim 1% 8549 0.006 0.031
Proportion seats in the dist won by Muslim in close election against non-Muslim 3% 8549 0.007 0.034
Proportion seats that had close elections Muslim vs non-Muslim 3% 8549 0.016 0.050
Notes: The percentages in Panel C refer to the vote margin on either side of zero that is used to define close elections between Muslim and non-Muslim candidates.  
s.d.
Panel A: Health and Demographics, Individual data, NFHS 1998-1999, birth cohorts 1977-1998
Mean
Table 1
Summary StatisticsOLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction Muslim legislators in district 0.536 -15.208** -14.847** -15.782** -0.33 -9.854* -11.122** -12.748**
[1.727] [7.313] [6.836] [6.954] [1.552] [5.859] [5.558] [5.454]
Fraction close elections between M -1.14 -2.218 -2.305 3.279 3.05 2.899
and non-M in district [2.937] [2.941] [2.915] [2.638] [2.669] [2.594]
Fraction Muslim legislators * Muslim household 4.183 7.279
[9.379] [7.917]
Muslim household -1.295*** -1.301*** -1.308*** -1.807 -0.661*** -0.665*** -0.672*** -1.540*
[0.321] [0.319] [0.321] [1.126] [0.254] [0.253] [0.253] [0.933]
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
Observations 128100 128100 128100 128100 128100 128100 128100 128100
District and year-of-birth FE YYYY YY Y Y
State*year-of-birth FE YYYY YY Y Y
3rd degree polynomial in victory margin YNYY YN Y Y
Party composition of legislators YNYY YN Y Y
Margin of victory 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Infant mortality Neo-natal mortality
Table 2
Muslim Legislators and Health Outcomes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. All regressions include controls for household characteristics such as 
dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other backward caste, male child, education levels of father and mother, age of mother at 
birth of child and its square, a dummy for multiple births and the child's birth rank. Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir .OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction Muslim legislators in district -0.031 -0.171 -0.154 -0.247 * 0.107 0.905 0.908 1.374 *
[0.040] [0.120] [0.123] [0.142]    [0.205] [0.616] [0.622] [0.729]
                         
Fraction close elections between M             0.051 0.029 0.029                 -0.173 -0.088 -0.089
and non-M in district [0.065] [0.057] [0.057]    [0.322] [0.289] [0.287]
Fraction Muslim legislators * Muslim household                           0.382                              -1.904
                          [0.290]                              [1.382]
Muslim household 0.144 *** 0.144 *** 0.144 *** 0.095 ** -0.858 *** -0.859 *** -0.858 *** -0.614 ***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.037] [0.056] [0.056] [0.056] [0.180]
            
R-squared         0.22         0.22         0.22         0.22         0.22         0.24         0.24         0.24
Observations       109448       109448       109448       109448          109448       109448       109448       109448
District and year-of-birth FE YYYY YY Y Y
State*year-of-birth FE YYYY YY Y Y
3rd degree polynomial in victory margin YNYY YN Y Y
Party composition of legislators YNYY YN Y Y
Margin of victory 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Illiteracy Years of primary school education
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parantheses, clustered at district level. All regressions include controls for  household characteristics such as 
dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other backward caste, male. Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir.
Table 3
Muslim Legislators and Educational OutcomesWider 
definition of 
close elections
Narrower 
definition of 
close 
elections
State-specific 
trends
District-specific 
trends
Include 
Jammu & 
Kashmir
Add years 
from 1961-
76
3-year average 
Muslim 
representation
Muslim 
representation 5 
years after birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction Muslim legislators in district -12.857** -13.778 -16.141** -13.104 -16.332** -17.236*** -16.870** 9.636
[5.577] [8.690] [6.585] [8.156] [7.147] [6.289] [7.372] [6.039]
Fraction Muslim legislators * Muslim household 1.12 -0.084 4.158 4.42 4.213 3.489 0.256 -7.979
[5.902] [14.309] [9.271] [9.265] [10.015] [6.694] [10.177] [7.248]
Muslim household -1.441* -1.299 -1.793 -1.8 -1.846 -1.830** -1.338 -0.643
[0.742] [1.693] [1.117] [1.115] [1.304] [0.788] [1.230] [0.989]
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04         0.05 0.04 0.05
Observations 128100 128100 128100 128100 132541       164832 127423 135710
Fraction Muslim legislators in district -10.273* -8.024 -12.839** -10.008 -13.248** -9.976* -10.675* 0.777
[5.246] [6.626] [5.192] [6.102] [5.592] [5.819] [6.434] [5.530]
Fraction Muslim legislators * Muslim household 2.043 4.386 6.632 7.405 7.796 5.546 2.573 -0.859
[4.819] [11.595] [7.890] [7.914] [8.457] [6.426] [7.371] [5.275]
Muslim household -0.916 -1.194 -1.463 -1.561* -1.71 -1.378* -0.982 -0.69
[0.586] [1.355] [0.930] [0.933] [1.091] [0.717] [0.879] [0.680]
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03         0.04 0.04 0.04
Observations 128100 128100 128100 128100 132541       164832 127423 135710
Margin of victory 3% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Panel A: Infant Mortality
Panel B: Neo-natal Mortality
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parantheses, clustered at district level. All regressions include controls for (i) district and year-of-birth fixed effects (ii) a 3rd 
degree polynomial in the victory margin and the fraction of elections in the district between Muslims and non-Muslims (iii) party composition of legislators (iv) household characteristics 
such as dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other backward caste, male child, education levels of father and mother, age of mother at birth of child and 
its square, a dummy for multiple births and the child's birth rank. Column (3) controls for state-specific trends and column (4) for district specific trends; all other columns control for 
state*year fixed effects. Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir except in column (6).
Table 4
Muslim Legislators and Health Outcomes: Robustness ChecksWider 
definition of 
close 
elections
Narrower 
definition of 
close 
elections
State-
specific 
trends
District-
specific 
trends
Include 
Jammu & 
Kashmir
Add years 
from 1961-76
Muslim 
representation in 
year before primary
Muslim 
representation 5 
years after 
completed primary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction Muslim legislators in district in 3 years -0.211 * -0.227 -0.264 * -0.340 ** -0.247 * -0.184 *       -0.187 -0.052
before primary school [0.113] [0.201] [0.145] [0.161] [0.143] [0.095]      [0.129]      [0.157]
Fraction Muslim legislators * Muslim household 0.367 ** 0.431 0.382 0.39 0.386 0.410 *        0.293 0.02
[0.186] [0.492] [0.289] [0.283] [0.295] [0.223]      [0.341]      [0.252]
Muslim household 0.097*** 0.089 0.095** 0.094*** 0.093** 0.115 *** 0.107** 0.142***
     [0.025]      [0.064]      [0.037]      [0.036]      [0.038] [0.026]      [0.043] [0.031]
R-squared         0.22         0.22         0.22         0.22         0.22 0.27         0.22 0.24
Observations       109448       109448       109448       109448       111827 203477       109448 66700
Fraction Muslim legislators in district in 3 years 1.006 * 1.266 1.374 * 1.566 ** 1.375 * 0.958 *        0.532 -0.224
before primary school [0.579] [1.011] [0.753] [0.782] [0.733] [0.522]      [0.599]      [0.701]
Fraction Muslim legislators * Muslim household -1.747 * -2.278 -1.9 -1.97 -1.927 -1.913 *       -1.398 0.028
[0.895] [2.201] [1.374] [1.351] [1.402] [1.150]      [1.536] [1.211]
Muslim household -0.634*** -0.566* -0.614*** -0.607*** -0.604*** -0.714 *** -0.681*** -0.861***
     [0.124]      [0.291]      [0.179]      [0.177]      [0.186] [0.131]      [0.196] [0.152]
R-squared         0.24         0.24         0.24         0.24         0.24 0.29         0.24 0.26
Observations       109448       109448       109448       109448       111827 203477       109448 66700
Margin of victory 3% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parantheses, clustered at district level. All regressions include controls for (i) district and year-of-birth fixed effects (ii) a 
3rd degree polynomial in the victory margin and the fraction of elections in the district between Muslims and non-Muslims (iii) party composition of legislators (iv) household 
characteristics such as dummies for rural residence, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other backward caste, male. Column (3) controls for state-specific trends and 
column (4) for district specific trends; all other columns control for state*year fixed effects. Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir except in column (6).
Table 5
Muslim Legislators and Education Outcomes: Robustness Checks
Panel A: Illiteracy
Panel B: Years of primary school educationEducation 
outcomes 
sample
(1) (2)
Fraction Muslim legislators in district 0.874***        0.891***
[0.067]      [0.156]
Fraction close elections between M  -0.361***       -0.373***
and non-M in district [0.052]      [0.080]
Observations 128100       109448
R-squared 0.93         0.94
F-statistic 167.61 12.31
District and year-of-birth FE Y Y
State*year-of-birth FE Y Y
3rd degree polynomial in victory margin Y Y
Party composition of legislators Y Y
Margin of victory 2% 2%
Health outcomes 
sample
Table A1
First Stage Results for Instrumental Variables Strategy
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parantheses, clustered at district level. 
All regressions include controls for household characteristics such as dummies for rural residence, 
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, Other backward caste, male. Health sample regressions 
also include controls for the education levels of father and mother, age of mother at birth of child 
and its square, a dummy for multiple births and the child's birth rank. Regressions exclude the state 
of Jammu & Kashmir.Muslim
Non-Hindu 
and non-
Muslim
Scheduled 
Caste
Scheduled 
Tribe
Other 
Backward 
Caste Rural area
Child is 
male
Age of mother 
at birth of child
Mother's 
years of 
education
Father's 
years of 
education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fraction Muslim legislators in district -0.032 0.041 0.115 -0.068 0.039 -0.004 0.025 1.972 -0.95 0.163
[0.078] [0.037] [0.072] [0.041] [0.080] [0.074] [0.096] [1.363] [0.677] [1.017]
Fraction close elections between Muslims
0.01 -0.003 -0.070** 0.057** 0.045 0.012 0.045 0.541 0.033 -0.283
and non-Muslims in district [0.037] [0.015] [0.033] [0.023] [0.037] [0.033] [0.044] [0.619] [0.322] [0.531]
R-squared 0.22 0.3 0.07 0.28 0.18 0.3 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.11
Observations 129694 129694 128389 128389 128389 129694 129694 129694 129638 129437
Characteristics of household Characteristics of child
Table A2
Verifying that Covariates Do Not Respond to the Instrumental Variable
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parantheses, clustered at district level. All regressions include controls for (i) district and year-of-birth fixed 
effects (ii) a 3rd degree polynomial in the victory margin (iii) state*year fixed effects. Regressions exclude the state of Jammu & Kashmir.Winner is non-
Muslim
Winner is 
Muslim
Difference 
significant?
Winner is from Congress 0.191 0.357 **
Winner is from BJP 0.318 0.020 **
Winner is from Left parties 0.100 0.122
Winner is from a national party 0.618 0.551
Winner is from a major party 0.791 0.735
Winner is an independent 0.064 0.112
Winner belongs to the ruling coalition 0.445 0.367
Winner is a woman 0.055 0.020
Total number of candidates 14.0 12.1
Total votes cast in election 89448 87960
Observations 110 98
Sample restricted to constituencies where the top two winners were a Muslim and a non-Muslim and the winner won by less than 2% of 
votes cast. ***indicates difference at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 1% level. Significance in differences calculated using a t-test. 
Parties are coded as being in the governing coalition if an MLA from their party was listed as being a minister in the Official Directories 
published until the mid-1980s, or online. We are grateful to Rikhil Bhavnani for sharing these data with us. Sample excludes the state of 
Jammu & Kashmir.
Table A3
Characteristics of Close Elections with Muslim and non-Muslim WinnersFigure 1. First Stage Illustration
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